When Carl Benjamin describes a "set of values", it sounds like he is describing axioms. The description of an axiom provided by Merriam-Webster online is:
In mathematics or logic, an axiom is an unprovable rule or first principle accepted as true because it is self-evident or particularly useful. “Nothing can both be and not be at the same time and in the same respect” is an example of an axiom. https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/axiom
The axiom example provided speaks to the “self-evident” subset of axioms in the description. I believe Carl was speaking to the "particularly useful" subset of axioms from the description. I think failing to make that distinction is the source of the disagreement (and the use of the word value might be adding to the confusion), because I think both parties would probably agree, if the distinction could be clearly established. I think you did make that point when you said, “you are saying there is something intrinsic to the structure of reason, which is itself objective and universal.” https://youtu.be/piprrQmiCuY?t=3113 Following that up with, “such as, nothing can both be and not be at the same time and in the same respect” might have made the difference.
I think it is also important to point out that axioms, despite our reasons for accepting them, affect our conclusions. I think it is possible to be perfectly logical and wrong, or come to incorrect conclusions, if a single axiom one accepts to be true is actually false (principle of explosion). This is why a higher IQ does not save one from coming to incorrect conclusions, even though one has the ability to come to the correct conclusion. This is why (I think) humans do not respond uniformly to evidence. Unfortunately, this appears to me to be a functional necessity of our ability to think abstractly. How else could we consider another person’s viewpoint? So, we inherently possess the potential for our logic to lead us to high confidence in incorrect conclusions. Another important note, is that a rational person acting in accordance with logic and reason, could appear wildly irrational to another rational person accepting different axioms, which is why your most recent book is so important and timely. If we are not talking to each other about axioms, and not letting our own axioms be explored openly, we can have no confidence in our own confidence.
I really enjoyed the conversation about sovereignty. Thank you for sharing!
It has me thinking about liberalism and the is-ought problem.
Due to what we know about statements about what is, we ought not accept as false what is true, because it leads to deductive explosion. Is this a moral truth that follows directly from descriptive or positive statements?
Ol' C. B. is wrong in that he appears to appeal continually to something like a slippery slope. So, saying gratuitous suffering is wrong objectively doesn't mean that all kinds of suffering are suddenly able to be called 'gratuitous'.
Sure, the edges of what counts as gratuitous will be blurry at times. But, to quote the late and incredibly great Stanley Rosen, 'Our success in making such identifications is not invalidated by our encountering problems in our analysis of how we identify things' like gratuitous suffering to begin with ('Elusiveness', p. 276).
C. B. also seems--very strangely, I might add--to be a staunch verificationist, in that if I can't 'prove' an intuition (not a 'gut feeling' here but an activity of looking at the world) that I have about gratuitous suffering, then it means that that intuition is valid for no one but me, or at most valid only for others who share it)
Of course this can't be quite right either, because C. B. cannot 'prove' his intuition that verificationism is itself correct. (And to ape Ray Tallis now, just because an objection--namely, performative contradiction--is raised often and even by undergrads, doesn't mean that that objection is useless.)
Nothing I've said here means I know what the just city looks like, nor what the right thing to do at every step of my life is; but it does suggest that C. B., though interesting rhetorically, is closer to a sophist than to a philosopher.
I’m surprised the discussion didn’t start with an assessment of the UDHR. The Islamic world dissented on its universality at the UN but the degree of consensus is quite high in terms of international law, as distinct from individual(istic) postmodern relativistic judgements.
There’s also Responsibility to Protect and an assessment of the points at which sovereignty can be breached by states in situations of gross atrocity crimes like genocide. The tripwire is fairly robust— UNSC agreement.
I was grateful for Lotus Eaters recent discussion of the website, Reduxx, which exposes the fallacies of trans ideology. He and his talking partner commented that the Reduxx articles are good, "for a feminist site." Many of us pushing back on the non-science and illogic of an ideology containing 143 "identities" &etc, do not self identify as feminists. Too many who call themselves that sell women and girls out of sports, female only spaces and even the role of mother. I really, really want to be interviewed over there!
Ute Heggen, trans widow, author of In the Curated Woods, True Tales from a Grass Widow
This conversation got my mind in a whirl. Thank you both.
When Carl Benjamin describes a "set of values", it sounds like he is describing axioms. The description of an axiom provided by Merriam-Webster online is:
In mathematics or logic, an axiom is an unprovable rule or first principle accepted as true because it is self-evident or particularly useful. “Nothing can both be and not be at the same time and in the same respect” is an example of an axiom. https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/axiom
The axiom example provided speaks to the “self-evident” subset of axioms in the description. I believe Carl was speaking to the "particularly useful" subset of axioms from the description. I think failing to make that distinction is the source of the disagreement (and the use of the word value might be adding to the confusion), because I think both parties would probably agree, if the distinction could be clearly established. I think you did make that point when you said, “you are saying there is something intrinsic to the structure of reason, which is itself objective and universal.” https://youtu.be/piprrQmiCuY?t=3113 Following that up with, “such as, nothing can both be and not be at the same time and in the same respect” might have made the difference.
I think it is also important to point out that axioms, despite our reasons for accepting them, affect our conclusions. I think it is possible to be perfectly logical and wrong, or come to incorrect conclusions, if a single axiom one accepts to be true is actually false (principle of explosion). This is why a higher IQ does not save one from coming to incorrect conclusions, even though one has the ability to come to the correct conclusion. This is why (I think) humans do not respond uniformly to evidence. Unfortunately, this appears to me to be a functional necessity of our ability to think abstractly. How else could we consider another person’s viewpoint? So, we inherently possess the potential for our logic to lead us to high confidence in incorrect conclusions. Another important note, is that a rational person acting in accordance with logic and reason, could appear wildly irrational to another rational person accepting different axioms, which is why your most recent book is so important and timely. If we are not talking to each other about axioms, and not letting our own axioms be explored openly, we can have no confidence in our own confidence.
I really enjoyed the conversation about sovereignty. Thank you for sharing!
Thanks. And thanks for the thoughtful comments. We may have a part 2!
I was on twitter and came accross this exchange between Carl Benjamin and other users.
https://twitter.com/Sargon_of_Akkad/status/1618323187313565705
It has me thinking about liberalism and the is-ought problem.
Due to what we know about statements about what is, we ought not accept as false what is true, because it leads to deductive explosion. Is this a moral truth that follows directly from descriptive or positive statements?
This was enjoyable as hell. Thanks.
Ol' C. B. is wrong in that he appears to appeal continually to something like a slippery slope. So, saying gratuitous suffering is wrong objectively doesn't mean that all kinds of suffering are suddenly able to be called 'gratuitous'.
Sure, the edges of what counts as gratuitous will be blurry at times. But, to quote the late and incredibly great Stanley Rosen, 'Our success in making such identifications is not invalidated by our encountering problems in our analysis of how we identify things' like gratuitous suffering to begin with ('Elusiveness', p. 276).
C. B. also seems--very strangely, I might add--to be a staunch verificationist, in that if I can't 'prove' an intuition (not a 'gut feeling' here but an activity of looking at the world) that I have about gratuitous suffering, then it means that that intuition is valid for no one but me, or at most valid only for others who share it)
Of course this can't be quite right either, because C. B. cannot 'prove' his intuition that verificationism is itself correct. (And to ape Ray Tallis now, just because an objection--namely, performative contradiction--is raised often and even by undergrads, doesn't mean that that objection is useless.)
Nothing I've said here means I know what the just city looks like, nor what the right thing to do at every step of my life is; but it does suggest that C. B., though interesting rhetorically, is closer to a sophist than to a philosopher.
Delighted you enjoyed it.
Peter
I’m surprised the discussion didn’t start with an assessment of the UDHR. The Islamic world dissented on its universality at the UN but the degree of consensus is quite high in terms of international law, as distinct from individual(istic) postmodern relativistic judgements.
There’s also Responsibility to Protect and an assessment of the points at which sovereignty can be breached by states in situations of gross atrocity crimes like genocide. The tripwire is fairly robust— UNSC agreement.
I wrote a related piece here:
http://web.ncf.ca/fs766/Collins_CharterHumanRights.pdf
You need a political scientist for this conversation!
Robin
We'll likely have a round 2!
I was grateful for Lotus Eaters recent discussion of the website, Reduxx, which exposes the fallacies of trans ideology. He and his talking partner commented that the Reduxx articles are good, "for a feminist site." Many of us pushing back on the non-science and illogic of an ideology containing 143 "identities" &etc, do not self identify as feminists. Too many who call themselves that sell women and girls out of sports, female only spaces and even the role of mother. I really, really want to be interviewed over there!
Ute Heggen, trans widow, author of In the Curated Woods, True Tales from a Grass Widow
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YQk0ekQKv84&t=10s